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A4U Analytical Studies N9
Comparative Analysis of Central EU Integration Structures
Draft for Discussion - V.1.5

18 December 2017

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Comparative Analysis of Central EU Integration Structures
Draft V.1.5 (Dec 18, 2017)

Dr Axel G Koetz

1 Goals and Coverage of the Analysis

1.1 Starting Point and Goal of the Analytical Note

The Government office of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration (GOEEI) is a central support unit to the Government to support and coordinate the Process of implementation of the Ukraine-EU Association agreement. The Structure of GOEEI has recently been changed. Goal of this short paper is to give an overview on comparable institutions of states in the accession process and/or with Association agreements.

1.2 Coverage and Methodology of the Analysis

For the study, the following states were chosen and their structures were analyzed, with Poland as a state which had already completed the accession process more than 10 years ago.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>USD p.c.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Sq.km</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>2.194</td>
<td>42.854</td>
<td>603.000</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a</td>
<td>Kyiv Oblast</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>2.804</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Poland 2004</td>
<td>12316</td>
<td>35.562</td>
<td>312.679</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>11.014</td>
<td>79.817</td>
<td>783.356</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Serbia (ex Kosovo)</td>
<td>5.379</td>
<td>7.058</td>
<td>77.474</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>6.629</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>13.812</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>5.021</td>
<td>2.073</td>
<td>25.713</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>4.617</td>
<td>3.531</td>
<td>51.179</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Albania Mid-2017</td>
<td>4.470</td>
<td>2.876</td>
<td>28.748</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>3.401</td>
<td>1.883</td>
<td>10.908</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>2.089</td>
<td>2.998</td>
<td>33.846</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>3.908</td>
<td>3.720</td>
<td>69.700</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Data of WB, HDI, Doing Business, Corruption Perception index usually of 2016. Data might differ from national data.

1 CoM decree No 759 of October 4, 2017, and related staff structure as communicated by GOEEI, October 20, 2017
Form the size point of view of size point of view, only Turkey, Poland and to a lower degree Serbia are comparable at all. The other states are rather small, some even smaller than Kyiv Oblast. It is however interesting to see how states deal with the tasks which are so much smaller than Ukraine.

The analysis was mainly based in information provided by the respective governments and institutions, which were provided publicly and were available on the websites of the respective governments and institutions. Documents were translated by the project as for numerous states only documents in the respective language were available and English versions of websites provided only limited information. All org sheets provided in this document were standardized on the basis of available material (org sheets, staff lists, functions lists etc.).

1.3 Indicators for the Analysis of Structures

There are a couple of indicators to consider for an analysis of the structures. Some of them are strategic, (Is the structure capable to support the strategy) some describe organizational quality (is the structure effective and efficient). A couple of indicators are;

(1) What is the legal form of the structure? It can be a dedicated ministry, a part of a ministry, an independent agency (Directorate, Office) or a subordinate office
(2) What is the position of the structure in the development process – starting with simple trade agreements over PCA, AA, Membership negotiations etc.
(3) Does the structure have an own administrative infrastructure or is it dependent from / supported by another institution?
(4) How is the management of the structure set up, in particular, how many management levels exist?
(5) How elaborated is the top management structure (additional leadership positions beside the “Nr 1” position – like vice ministers, deputy directors etc.) ABOVE the technical structure
(6) Are there staff units existing to support the top level?
(7) How high is the span of control of the key levels?
(8) How are functions and responsibilities clustered?
(9) How much staff is available to do the work?
2 Key findings

2.1 Overview

The following table provides a compilation of key indicators and their implementation in the selected administrations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Own Admin</th>
<th>Lead</th>
<th>other Top Mgr</th>
<th>Staff Units</th>
<th>1st Techn. Level</th>
<th>2nd Techn. level</th>
<th>Staff (Plan)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>GOEEI (New)</td>
<td>Independent unit of the CM Secretariat. Subordinated to PM, VPM for EU and Atlantic Integration Issues, and STS of CM</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Dir</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>Office of the Committee for European Integration</td>
<td>Office under PM (as head of the committee for European integration)</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Secr</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>nA</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>nA</td>
<td>up to 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR</td>
<td>Ministry for EU Affairs</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>est. 250+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Ministry of European Integration</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNE</td>
<td>Ministry for European Affairs</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td>Secretariat for European Affairs</td>
<td>Secretariat subordinate to the Deputy PM for EU Integration</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>State Secr</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>4 Pers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>nA</td>
<td>nA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Directorate for European Integration</td>
<td>Independent expert Body of the CM</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Dir</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>nA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AL</td>
<td>Ministry for European Integration (until 9.2017) - now bundled with MoFA</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RKS</td>
<td>Ministry of EU Integration</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>nA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>Part of MoFA and EU Integration, led by one State Secretary</td>
<td>Ministry department, no own legal status</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>State Secr</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>nA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>Office of the state minister on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration</td>
<td>State Ministers office</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>State Min</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3+2</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own analysis, see chapter 4

2.2 Findings in Detail

2.2.1 Legal Position

Six of the eleven analyzed units have been organized as ministries with cabinet rank, one is a ministry department (the will be two because of the changes in Albania). Four act as “office” with no cabinet rank of the head. Of the offices, those in Poland and Macedonia were directly attached to a Deputy MP for EU Integration. Some are, like UA, strongly linked of subordinated to the Apparatus of the respective CM.

Strategically the question is whether the proximity to the center of government outweights the advantages of a cabinet level ministry, may be directly under a Deputy PM. This is a strategical issue and can be decided only considering the dominant political structures. Here plays also the position within the CM structures an important role.
2.2.2 Function Clusters

The comparative analysis inter alia collected – on macro level – information on the functions which were performed in the units. The main functions found were related to

- Political and strategical issues
- Sector management (Industrial sectors, key other topics)
- EU legal approximation
- Management of the integration process
- Overall Management of EU funds and other funds
- Public Relations
- General services (administration), if applicable

This means that 6 units were sufficient to put the functions in organizational structures. Further diversifications could then be elaborated in the respective substructures. It is questionable if the responsibility for sectoral issues should be split and assigned to several technical units.

2.2.3 Top Level Staff Units

In the majority of the analyzed institutions, the top level is supported by staff units, at least in the form of an “office of the minister / director”.

Some units however cannot be seen as typical staff units. For example in some cases the general services / administration unit is put to staff level. It is da facto a nine unit. Also in some cases the function of the Negotiator and the related staff is seen as staff unit. Dis might be doubted as Accession negotiation is a key line function.

The GOEEI head nevertheless as no support by any staff units and can only make use of persons from the line units, which might be temporarily taken away from their original tasks. This worsens the assumed “bottleneck” problems.

2.2.4 Staffing

Sufficient staffing is most important for the success of policy implementation. Comparable data were made available by several institutions. The comparison of staffing of EU integration institutions and population shows the following relation:
Population to staff Ratio

X: Population in million, Y: Staff (plan) of institutions. Source: own computation.

GOEEI in its present structure with a planned staff of 50 trails by far, compared with all other institutions. Even a country with just 600,000 Inhabitants like Montenegro has a staff (plan) of 106, Albania had 110. Even Georgia as a small country invested more staff capacity then UA. There might be some additional staff needs for own administrative staff and of staff for accession negotiations, but not in this dimension. An additional question is if all planned positions are filled. At least for UA it is known that a substantial number of vacancies exists.

To a high degree, staff needs depend on the level which a state has reached in the Integration process. Such levels might be

- Trade agreements with the EU
- Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
- Association Agreement (old style / for example Poland)
- Association Agreement incl. DCFTA (new style, UKR)
- EU Candidate status
- Accession / Membership negotiations
- Entry in the EU

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2 Very helpful input was provided by Cesar Herma.
For Poland, for example, in the time of the trade agreements, around 30 posts were involved. 1996 (AA old version), about 100 were involved, and in the final negotiations on accession the involved staff numbers increased to about 300+. Ukraine is, from this viewpoint, presently best comparable with Serbia. Staff needs for example for the membership negotiation which existed in the final phase in Poland (and presently exists in Turkey) are no topic.

On the other hand, some states created units in which next to EU issues also NATO and Euro-Atlantic issues are dealt with. This is the fact for example in Ukraine and in Georgia. This leads to a reduction of capacities for EU Integration

2.2.5 Span of Control

The span of control in the analyzed units differs extremely. Span of control describes the relation between supervisor and direct subordinates and is a strong organizational quality criteria. In GOEEI it is 1:11, what is by far the highest ration of all institutions analyzed. Considering the number of Managers (Like Minister, Deputy Minister, State Secretary, General Secretary) above the technical level and the first technical level (departments or divisions), the cumulated span of control lies between 1 and 3.5, Macedonia has 8 and GOEEI has 11.

A high span of control might be seen as very efficient (“flat hierarchy”) but this does not all the time work in a high level political environment with rather complicated functions and numerous actors which want to be satisfied. The top level might be massively overloaded, processes be slowed down and conflicts not properly managed (“Bottleneck-problem”). The technical staff might be not able to (or has no sufficient authority to) deal with high level stakeholders in politics and administration.

3 Comparison GOEEI and other EU Integration Institutions

The comparison of GOEEI with EU Integration institutions in other countries leads to the following findings:

- With a staff of in total 50, GOEEI is relatively small, compared with other institution and in particular as the planned staff is only partially existing.
- Compared to others, no organizational slack can be found on management level.
- GOEEI has a rather low formal position (office under the CM state secretary) in the hierarchy of institutions while many others were headed by ministers. On the other hand, GOEEI is directly connected to the Center of government.
- It is not clear how the triple subordination of GOEEI (to PM, to DPM for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration and to CM StS works; this would need an internal analysis. However, such subordination structures seem to be unusual in other institutions
- It is questionable if the state expert and lead expert positions in GOEEI are motivating options for high quality staff as in other structures hierarchical positions like section head, (department) director, division head, general director and similar are offered.
- GOEEI structure is extremely “flat” and the director has a high span of control (1:11), which are the by far highest in the comparison, and there exist neither deputy directors nor staff units to support. This bears the risk of bottleneck problems.

4 Detailed Unit Structures

4.1 Ukraine – GOEEI

The Government office for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration has recently changed its structure. In the course of this, former management levels were eliminated and the structure is now extremely “flat”:

![Diagram showing GOEEI structure]

The structure consists of 8 Expert groups of 3-5 (in max 9 subordinate experts) and 3 additional Experts without subordinate structures. In total, GOEEI employs now (in plan) 50 people, but the posts are only partly filled. This leads to a span of control of the top level of 1:11, whilst 8 expert group heads have a span of control of 3-5. From the perspective of organizational quality, the span of control of the DG is rather high and the span of control of most expert group heads is rather low. The (planned) staff is rather small. Two of the expert groups (planned staff of 10 from the in total 50) deal with NATO issues, this reduces the net capacity for EU Issues by 20%.

The small expert groups bear the risk of knowledge losses. People who drop out leave a knowledge hole. As de facto only a part of the posts are filled, this might lead to real problems.

4.2 Poland (2004)

Poland’s “Office of the Committee for European Integration” was highly developed and large with a staff size of up to around 300 – 400. It was headed by the Minister for European Affairs, with 2 Under state secretaries in the leadership positions and 14 departments (2 directly subordinated to the head and 3 administrative departments subordinated to a Director General

From a structural point of view, the availability of 2 deputy under-secretaries with dedicated functions. The minister, at the same time secretary of the EU Integration committee, has a rather direct rule over the office.
The Unit was designed to gain continuously staff during the process, from the trade agreement process over the AA process until the Membership negotiation and accession process. Lowest level units were relatively big and additional staff could be “digested” by the structures, with changing priorities during the process.

Span of control on the management level for the secretary is 5, for the under-secretaries and the director general is 3 to 6, making an effective leadership possible. Lessons to learn from the Poland case might be:

a) Effective work needs substantial staff. With a staff of up to 400, the unit had the necessary strength as well as some “slack”\(^3\)

b) Two under-secretaries could provide an effective bundling of issues and be, next to the head, competent partners of the political level

c) The concept of a “breathing” units makes a lot of sense to improve efficiency and to avoid long-term overstaffing.

4.3 Turkey

Turkey operates a Ministry for EU affairs, including the function of the chef negotiator for EU accession. The ministry has an extended structure with various layers, (at least 5 management levels:

\[^3\text{Slack is defined as resource surplus over the resources necessary for the immediate business.}\]
Minister, deputy minister, Undersecretary, Deputy under-secretaries, Directors). It has a structure of line- as well as of staff structures.

There are 14 technical departments which are led by 4 deputy undersecretaries. Of 4 departments staff lists are known, with existing (not planned) staff between 8 and 14. In addition to this, 7 staff units exists on different levels and, also, a directorate for administrative services. An extrapolation of the staff numbers leads to an assumed overall staff of 200 – 250.

Important facts to learn from are in so far

a) Significant staffing quantity
b) Viable department units with substantial capacities
c) Steep hierarchy and availability of staff units and high level internal advisors gives the opportunity to analyze problems more in depth and have enough counterparts on significant level in the government administration.

d) Deputy undersecretaries (equivalent to DGs) can take a quality management role and supports the political level with technical expertise.

4.4 Serbia

Serbia has, like Turkey, a very developed structure for a ministry related to EU integration, which shows how seriously the issue is taken in the country. However, the respective structures seem to be very small, compared with the structures in Turkey. We assume that too much capacity is used for internal coordination.

The org sheet shows only the first 3 or 4 organizational levels; the org sheet added in the annex shows the extent lower level structure.

It makes in any case sense to have a top level structure of:

- Management of the Accession process
- Management of Funds
- Bilateral / International Cooperation
- Communication and Training,

Also a general staff structures serving internal works and as well the minister is useful. Again, significant “slack” and free thinking capacity can exist, as well as capacity for high level communication. Lessons learned from Serbia are

a) Sustainable size (about 189)
b) 3 management levels – Min, STS, GDs
c) Problem: fragmentation of units

4.5 Montenegro

Montenegro is an accession state and the by far smallest state in the comparison, by population much smaller than the city of Kyiv alone.

Nevertheless the present org structure shows a staff of 106 positions (plan), with a 4-level structure (Min / State secretary, 5 directorates with 2-3 department and subordinate sections.

4.6 Macedonia

A concrete structure of the Macedonian Unit could not be provided, however leadership and working units are available.
4.6.1 Structures

Macedonia (Accession State) has a small but high-leveled structure in place. A deputy MP for European Affairs takes the overall responsibility for the Integration and Accession process. The secretariat for European Affairs under a state secretary and with 4 state counsellors and 8 sectors is implementing the accession policy.

**Leadership**

- Deputy PM for EU Integration
- State Secretary
- Presently 4 State Counsellors

**8 Sectors**

- Sector for integration
- Sector for support on the negotiations for EU membership
- Sector for coordination of the European funds and other foreign assistance
- Sector for preparation of the national version of acquis communautaire
- Sector for management and public relations
- Sector for general and legal affairs
- Sector for information and communication technology
- Sector for financial affairs

The organizational structure has only a very limited management capacity, de facto it seems to have only the state secretary. Of the 8 sectors, only 5 are oriented to the key functions of the EU Accession process whilst 3 (General and legal affairs, ICT and financial affairs) are elements of the internal administration.  

4.6.2 Accession to the EU Process Management System

With the adoption of ‘The Strategy bases of the Republic of Macedonia for acquiring associative EU member status’ as of September 1997, the Government set up grounds for establishing management system of the European integration process. In the function of major effectiveness and efficiency as well as increasing obligations towards the European Union, this system has been continuously upgraded.

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4 Staff quantities are not available
5 This chapter taken from: http://www.sep.gov.mk/en/content/?id=3#.Wi_a_lXiZxA
Key Elements of the cooperation structures are

- **Committee for Euro-Atlantic Integration** – represents the decision-making body of the country policy in the European integration process. The Committee is chaired by the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Ministers and all Ministers in the Government, as well as the Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia and the President of MASA are its members.

- **Working Committee for European Integration of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia** – is chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister of the Government in charge of European Affairs, and all state secretaries of the ministries are its members. This operational and interministerial body defines the methods and dynamics for implementation of strategic decisions, political guidelines and priorities of the Government and carries out monitoring on the realization of the actual tasks.

- **The Deputy Prime Minister of the Government in charge of European Affairs** – manages and coordinates the operative part of integration process of the Secretariat for European Affairs, ensures coordination and conformation of the work of the state administrative
authorities and other bodies and institutions in the preparation of the Republic of Macedonia relating to negotiations and membership in the European Union.

- **The Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Sector for the European Union** – is in charge of the communication with the European structures through the Mission of the Republic of Macedonia in Brussels, gathering valid and timely information that have impact on the integration process, as well as presenting uniform perspectives and positions in the European structures.

Furthermore, the Committee of Working Groups for Approximation of Legislation, the Secretariat for Legislation (evaluating the approximation of legislation), the **General Secretariat within the Government** (to observe Article 66 of the Rules of Procedure of the Government for approximation with the EU regulations), the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia (adopting the laws in the field of European integration), the **Committee for European Affairs within the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia** and the **National Council for European Integration** actively participate in the process of approximation of the national with the EU legislation.

The structure as well as the process model are reminiscent of to the present and former structures in Ukraine (GOEEI old and new). However, the size relation has to be considered. Macedonia with 2 million inhabitants is smaller than Kyiv Oblast (2.8 Mio)

### 4.7 BiH

The Directorate for European Integration (DEI) is a permanent, independent and expert body of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Among other things, DEI coordinates financial assistance of the European Union and the DEI Director is also the National Coordinator for IPA.

DEI constitutes of 6 Units (Divisions) under the Director, of which 5 are technical and 1 deals with internal Administration issues (General Affairs). The division are composed of 2-5 Departments (in total 18).

Unfortunately no staff lists are available. The organizational structure of DEI is as follows:

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There is only one higher management position (Director), but in the 6 directorates the key topics of EU Integration are properly bundled. The Division heads (2-5 direct subordinates) and the Director (6 direct subordinates) have an acceptable span of control.

Lessons learned
- Very clear structure with logical bundling
- Proper span of control at management level and on technical level

4.8 Albania

EU integration structures in Albania have changed over time. The present structure (Min for EU Integration and Foreign Affairs) is rather unclear (even the Albanian Embassy in Berlin did not know about), but for the structure which existed until September 2017, data exists.

The former ministry for EU Integration had a staff of over 100 (plan). It was led by a Minister, a Deputy Minister and a Secretary General. The work structure consisted of 7 departments, of which 5 were technical and 2 were related to internal administration.
The structure of the former Ministry is comparably flat as the GOEEI structure, but with one additional layer (Director General). Main lessons learned from Albania:

- Even for a small country like Albania sustainable departments and units exist, staff (plan) was 2 x as high than in GOEEI
- Viable departments and units exist

4.9 Kosovo

Kosovo has a Ministry for EU Integration. The structure of the Ministry includes a sectoral approach, which at the same time allows the ministry officials to work closely with the senior officials of the line ministries for the strategy of European integration and development, while also providing a sectoral contact point for development partners. The Ministry has the following structure:

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7 Ministry website, 10.11.2017
Key functions of the Ministry were (According to Min Website):

- Preparing and monitoring strategic documents for advancing the implementation of criteria and obligations required by the European integration process. This includes preparing these documents and harmonizing them with other strategic Government documents. MEI also organizes the preparation and presentation of relevant documents by line organizations according to deadlines defined by the integration process.

- Assisting and organizing mechanisms of donor coordination. To this end, MEI aims to harmonize external assistance with Kosovo’s European agenda. In this context, coordinating, programming and monitoring EU assistance programs given to the Government of the Republic of Kosovo, according to our country’s priorities. With these programs, MEI prepares and signs EU financial assistance agreements in the name of the Republic of Kosovo.

- Coordination, monitoring and analysis of the advancement of the process of harmonizing domestic legislation with that of the EU, assessing the accordance of this legislation with EU law and coordinating the translation of EU legislation for the process of harmonizing domestic legislation with that of the EU.

- In cooperation with other responsible institutions, MEI prepares and coordinates the process of developing capacities in the field of European integration making possible the functioning of effective institutions, able to attract and maintain talented professionals giving a positive example of institutions with professional and managerial standards.

- Establishing a program of public communications regarding European Integration issues to ensure that the citizens of Kosovo are well informed about European Integration.
4.10 Moldova

Whilst Moldova (EnP country like Ukraine) is looking to Europe and had the accession agreement signed, the EU Integration related activities seem to be, from an organizational point of view, much less prominent than in UA. EU integration is managed by one rather small unit in the ministry, led by a state secretary.

The structure includes units for political, economic, and regional cooperation. Substructures and staffing could not be provided.

4.11 Georgia

With a staff of about 60, the EU Integration unit is not much bigger than in Ukraine (consider the country has only about 10% of the Ukrainian population), but a clear structure with two deputies under the head. This supports again the bundling of topics and an improved capacity to communicate with the political level.
The main technical responsibility lies in the hands of the First Deputy minister with a staff of 23 in 2 Departments and 2 subordinate sections.

Lessons learned from Georgia

- Relatively big top level structure (1+4)
- High level position of the top manager

Dr Axel G Koetz
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